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WHEN EMPATHY BITES BACK:
CAUTIONARY TALES FROM NEUROSCIENCE
FOR CAPITAL SENTENCING
Sheri Lynn Johnson,* Amelia Courtney Hritz,** Caisa Elizabeth Royer***
& John H. Blume****
We must learn to regard people less in light of what they do or omit to do
and more in light of what they suffer.1
Because he was just a dumb nigger.2

INTRODUCTION
It is not easy to persuade most people to willfully choose to kill another
human being.3 Because obtaining a death sentence requires persuading
twelve individuals to do just that, most capital trials involve efforts by the
prosecutor to dehumanize the defendant. If jurors come to see the defendant
as “different,” “other,” or not “fully human,” they are more likely to
determine that the defendant “deserves” the ultimate punishment, making
what the U.S. Supreme Court has described as essentially a moral judgment
about the value of the life of the accused.
* James and Mark Flanagan Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Public Engagement, and
Assistant Director, Death Penalty Project, Cornell Law School. This Article is part of a
symposium entitled Criminal Behavior and the Brain: When Law and Neuroscience Collide
held at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the symposium, see Deborah
W. Denno, Foreword: Criminal Behavior and the Brain: When Law and Neuroscience
Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2016).
** Graduate student in the dual J.D./Ph.D. Developmental Psychology and Law Program,
Cornell University.
*** Graduate student in the dual J.D./Ph.D. Developmental Psychology and Law Program,
Cornell University.
**** Samuel F. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques and Director, Death Penalty Project,
Cornell Law School.
1. DIETRICH BONHOFFER, WITNESS TO JESUS CHRIST 262 (John de Grunchy ed., 1991).
2. A juror’s answer to why he believed capital defendant Johnny Bennett murdered the
victim. Bennett’s death sentence was later overturned because the sentencing “was so infected
by racial animus by the prosecutor and a juror . . . that Bennett was deprived of his
constitutional right to due process.” Andrew Cohen, A Judge Overturned a Death Sentence
Because the Prosecutor Compared a Black Defendant to King Kong, MARSHALL PROJECT
(Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/03/28/a-judge-overturned-a-deathsentence-because-the-prosecutor-compared-a-black-defendant-to-king-kong#.VJueiNz4G
[https://perma.cc/2MAU-VS7S].
3. See generally DAVID GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF
LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY (2003).
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But why is this so?
The answer lies with the fact that jurors are much less likely to empathize
with a defendant whom they perceive as being not like them. This process
of dehumanization is often pursued through explicit, time-tested strategies,
such as comparing the defendant to a wild, crazed animal4 or casting him
(and it is virtually always a “he”) as a psychopathic killer.5 Dehumanization
also can be pursued implicitly by contrasting the value of a defendant’s life
with that of the victim.6 No matter how it is accomplished, dehumanizing a
defendant helps to overcome a juror’s natural human inhibition against taking
another person’s life.7
Conversely, lawyers for a defendant facing the ultimate punishment
generally see their task as humanizing their client. Defense lawyers believe
that if jurors can identify with the defendant, imagine his “walk in life,” or
“see the world through his eyes,” they are less likely to choose the death
penalty.8 Capital defense teams pursue humanization—for the most part—
through investigation, development, and presentation of mitigating
evidence.9 The Supreme Court has defined mitigating evidence very broadly:
anything that might legitimately persuade a juror to choose life over death.10
Common types of mitigating evidence offered at capital trials include
evidence of suffering and disadvantage experienced by the defendant, such
as childhood physical and sexual abuse, low cognitive functioning, poverty,
brain damage, substance abuse and addiction, trauma, and mental illness, as
well as positive traits such as prior good acts, talents, and adaptability to
confinement.11 Such evidence, and the empathy for the defendant it is
intended to create, is perceived as central to persuading jurors to spare a
capital defendant’s life. Without empathy, the exercise of mercy is rare.

4. See, e.g., Bennett v. Stirling, No. CV 2:13-3191-RMG, 2016 WL 1070812, at *2
(D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2016) (describing how a prosecutor referred to the defendant as “King Kong
on a bad day,” a “caveman,” and a “beast of burden”).
5. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 931 P.2d 960, 997–98 (Cal. 1997) (comparing the defendant
to Adolf Hitler, Charles Manson, and the “Sacramento Vampire Killer,” Richard Chase);
Ballenger v. State, 667 So. 2d 1242, 1269 (Miss. 1995) (comparing the defendant to Charles
Manson).
6. See, e.g., Freeman v. State, 776 So. 2d 160, 184–85 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting
the prosecutor’s closing argument, which compared the victim (an honor student) and the
victim’s mother (who worked hard to provide for her children) to the defendant (a person who
“couldn’t get what he wanted”)).
7. This is not unique to capital sentencing. The same process underlies many historical
forms of medical and animal experimentation. See Sherry F. Colb, The Hidden Atrocities
Behind Medical Progress, VERDICT (Mar. 30, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/03/30/
the-hidden-atrocities-behind-medical-progress (describing medical experiments on slaves
performed without anesthesia as requiring the suppression of empathy) [https://perma.cc/
2UHW-683B]; see also GROSSMAN, supra note 3.
8. See Sean D. O’Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the
Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 722–
24 (2008).
9. See id.
10. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 6 (1986).
11. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1547 n.41 (1998).
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When a capital defendant is sentenced to death, jurors have failed to cross
what Craig Haney has referred to as “the empathic divide,” which he
describes as the “inability to perceive capital defendants as enough like
themselves to readily feel any of their pains, to appreciate the true nature of
the struggles they have faced, or to genuinely understand how and why their
lives have taken very different courses from the jurors’ own.”12 This
inability, in turn, results in jurors making what we (two capital defense
lawyers and two psychologists) believe to be a fundamental attribution error
by “systematically discounting the important social, historical, and
situational determinants of behavior . . . and correspondingly exaggerating
the causal role of dispositional or individual characteristics.”13
Thus, empathy lies at the core of the capital trial. The rub, however, is
that, despite decades of research, empathy is not clearly understood, and its
implications for capital trials are largely unexplored. The confusion is—in
some part—grounded in varying definitions of empathy used by those
studying it.14 There are at least eight different methods of conceptualizing
empathy,15 and the concepts vary when researchers analyze different
questions.16 Definitions of empathy range from a focus on the cognitive
ability to understand another person’s perspective (known as “attributionally
driven” empathy) to the emotional ability to feel what another person feels
(known as “perceptual and sensory driven” empathy).17
Advances in neuroscience have allowed researchers to begin exploring the
different components of empathy. For example, some studies suggest that
cognitive and affective components of empathy reflect distinct neural
mechanisms.18 Neuroscientists typically understand empathy to include an
12. Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism,
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2004).
13. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized
Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 590.
14. See Frederique de Vignemont & Tania Singer, The Empathic Brain: How, When and
Why?, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 435, 435 (2006) (“There are probably nearly as many
definitions of empathy as people working on the topic.”); Jean Decety & William Ickes,
Introduction: Seeking to Understand the Minds (and Brains) of People Who Are Seeking to
Understand Other People’s Minds, in THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, at vii, vii (Jean
Decety & William Ickes eds., 2009) (noting that empathy is a complicated construct that “has
been used by different writers in very different ways”).
15. See C. Daniel Batson, These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct
Phenomena, in THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, supra note 14, at 3, 4–8 (discussing
that there are eight different psychological states corresponding to distinct concepts of
empathy, including (1) knowing another person’s internal state, (2) adopting the posture of an
observed other, (3) coming to feel as another person feels, (4) projecting oneself into another’s
situation, (5) imagining how another is feeling, (6) imagining how one would feel in the other’s
place, (7) feeling distress at witnessing another person’s suffering, and (8) feeling for another
person who is suffering).
16. See id. at 3 (“Application of the term empathy to so many distinct phenomena is, in
part, a result of researchers invoking empathy to provide an answer to two quite different
questions: How can one know what another person is thinking and feeling? What leads one
person to respond with sensitivity and care to the suffering of another?”).
17. See Nancy Eisenberg & Natalie D. Eggum, Empathic Responding: Sympathy and
Personal Distress, in THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, supra note 14, at 71.
18. See infra Part I.A.
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affective response to another person’s emotions and a cognitive ability to
adapt the other person’s perspective.19 The first, “affective” component
involves a neural response similar to the experience of one’s own emotional
state. This affective response creates an emotional reaction to imagining the
other person’s thoughts, feelings, and perspective.20 The second, “cognitive”
component involves imagining the world through the eyes of another
person.21 This is an intentional ability that uses cognitive resources to take
another’s perspective.22 Building on these findings, neuroscientists have
explored individual differences in the experience of empathy and the impact
of characteristics of the person with whom they are empathizing (the target
of the empathy).
This Article examines the implications of emerging neuroscientific
findings regarding empathy for capital trials.23 We have approached this task
with caution because neuroscientists’ understanding of the human brain is
still evolving.24 As with any new field, if neuroscience is completely trusted
before it is thoroughly tested, there is a risk of embracing the new
phrenology.25 Given the state of the research, our advice to defense lawyers
is quite modest, but we believe that there are some important lessons for
lawyers, judges, legislators, and other stakeholders in the capital punishment
system.
Earlier research from the Capital Jury Project (CJP) has revealed that
jurors primarily decide whether to impose a sentence of death based on three
factors: (1) how heinous they believe the crime was, (2) how dangerous they
believe the defendant to be, and (3) whether they perceive the defendant to

19. See Jean Decety & Sara D. Hodges, The Social Neuroscience of Empathy, in BRIDGING
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 103 (Paul A.M. Van Lange ed., 2006).
20. See Karyn M. Plumm & Cheryl A. Terrance, Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact
of Expert Testimony and Empathy Induction in the Courtroom, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
186, 191 (2009).
21. See id.
22. See Jean Decety & Philip L. Jackson, A Social-Neuroscience Perspective on Empathy,
15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 54, 55 (2006).
23. Cf. Emily Hughes, The Empathic Divide in Capital Trials: Possibilities for Social
Neuroscientific Research, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541 (noting the need for additional research
to develop methods for crossing the empathic divide).
24. See Carl Zimmer, Updated Brain Map Identifies Nearly 100 New Regions, N.Y. TIMES
(July 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/science/human-connectome-brainmap.html (reporting that neuroscientists have recently identified “nearly 100 previously
unknown [brain] regions” and that “[i]t may take decades for scientists to figure out what each
region is doing, and more will be discovered in coming decades”) [https://perma.cc/28ZH2TZQ].
25. See Simon Oxenham, Thousands of fMRI Brain Studies in Doubt Due to Software
Flaws, NEW SCIENTIST (July 18, 2016), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2097734thousands-of-fmri-brain-studies-in-doubt-due-to-software-flaws/ (“It’s another blow for
neuroscience. The discovery of major software flaws could render thousands of fMRI brain
studies inaccurate.”) [https://perma.cc/C7DE-SEJ8]; see also Gerald Bierbaum, SMO: FrontLoading Mitigation, VOICE DEF. ONLINE (July 2, 2016), http://www.voiceforthedefense
online.com/newsletters/2016/July2016.pdf
(discussing
“overclaiming”
based
on
neuroscience) [https://perma.cc/6AUJ-Q4DA].
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be remorseful.26 The jurors’ assessment of these three factors, however, is
influenced by both the race of the defendant and the jurors’ interpretation of
mitigating evidence.27 Building on this foundation, we explore the empathy
research to better understand why and how the presumptively legitimate
factor of mitigating evidence—and the facially impermissible factor of
race—affect capital sentencing decisions.
Part I, the bulk of this Article, sets forth the relevant scientific findings
concerning empathy. We begin with a brief discussion of what is known
about empathy, including individual differences for the capacity to
empathize, and then describe the tendency to empathize with people who feel
familiar. Part I also addresses how empathy for one person can cause
individuals to act with aggression toward others, noting that juror empathy
for victims can therefore be harmful to capital defendants. Finally, Part I also
examines the results of efforts by researchers to increase empathy in a variety
of contexts.
Part II turns to the application of this research for the practice of capital
punishment. We address both the obligations this knowledge imposes on
trial courts and the advice it suggests to capital defense lawyers. We consider
implications for jury selection, the presentation of evidence, and arguments
by counsel. We conclude that the neuroscience findings we have summarized
provide additional support for our prior conviction: it is not possible for a
system of capital punishment to neutrally determine which defendants
“deserve” death.
I. THE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY
We begin with an overview of the research on the neuroscience of
empathy, including a discussion of individual differences in empathy, outgroup bias (including racial bias), dehumanization, empathy-linked
aggression, and what is known about how empathy for another person can be
increased.
A. The Nature of Empathy
As noted above, there are multiple definitions of empathy that are
varyingly deployed depending both upon the researcher and the question or
questions being asked.28 For the purposes of this Article, we define empathy
as the act of understanding and adopting another’s perspective, either through
affective or cognitive processes.29 Empathy is distinct from sympathy, which

26. See John H. Blume et al., Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of
Knowing and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1037
(2008).
27. See id. at 1047 n.44.
28. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
29. See Tamara M. Haegerich & Bette L. Bottoms, Empathy and Jurors’ Decisions in
Patricide Trials Involving Child Sexual Assault Allegations, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 421, 422
(2000); see also Frank Krueger et al., Oxytocin Selectively Increases Perceptions of Harm for
Victims but Not the Desire to Punish Offenders of Criminal Offenses, 8 SOC. COGNITIVE &
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is the act of feeling “sorrow or concern for another.”30 While sympathy
involves feeling sadness for another person, empathy involves sharing
another person’s emotions.31 That emotion could be sadness, but it also could
be a different emotion, such as pain, happiness, or anger. Whether sympathy
and empathy influence behavior in distinct ways is not clear, and
neuroimaging cannot yet distinguish between sympathetic and affective brain
responses.32 Despite this uncertainty, many researchers believe that the
concept of empathy should be defined narrowly.33 By focusing on a narrow
understanding of empathy that is distinct from sympathy, researchers are able
to make more precise claims about the neural mechanisms underlying
empathy and its subsequent influence on behavior.34
Neuroscientists35 make the distinction that empathy results from two
different neural processes: (1) an effortful cognitive attempt to take on
another person’s perspective (i.e., understanding another’s feelings) and (2)
an affective response to another person’s emotions (i.e., sharing another’s
feelings).36 Neuroscientists have attempted to pinpoint where both
components of empathy occur in the brain using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) and have found variation in which brain regions
are associated with empathy.37
The cognitive component of empathy is associated with increased activity
in the frontal and parietal cortices,38 which include networks associated with
understanding what others are thinking based on their behavior.39 Studies
demonstrating the affective component of empathy have shown that
perception of a given behavior in another individual can automatically
activate one’s own representations of that behavior.40 Mirror neurons likely
explain this process.41 The mirror neuron system is a network of brain cells
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 494, 494 (2013) (defining empathy as “the capacity to share and
understand the feelings of others”).
30. Nancy Eisenberg & Paul Miller, Empathy, Sympathy, and Altruism: Empirical and
Conceptual Links, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 292 (Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer
eds., 1990).
31. See Haegerich & Bottoms, supra note 29, at 438.
32. See de Vignemont & Singer, supra note 14, at 439–40.
33. See id. at 435.
34. See id.
35. While most neuroscientists make this distinction, other researchers do not.
Throughout this Article, we will note if the researcher has indicated that he or she is measuring
cognitive or affective empathy. If not specified, the researcher did not distinguish between
the two.
36. See Decety & Hodges, supra note 19, at 103; Plumm & Terrance, supra note 20, at
191.
37. See Decety & Hodges, supra note 19, at 103 (“Our task is not to identify a single
neural/cognitive module for empathy; no such simple module exists.”).
38. See id. at 104.
39. See Henrik Walter, Social Cognitive Neuroscience of Empathy: Concepts, Circuits,
and Genes, 4 EMOTION REV. 9, 13 (2012) (finding that networks associated with mentalizing
include the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the posteromedial cortex, the bilateral
temporoparietal junction, and the bilateral superior temporal sulcus).
40. See id. at 11.
41. See generally Giuseppe di Pellegrino et al., Understanding Motor Events: A
Neurophysiological Study, 91 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 176 (1992).
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that fire both during performance of a task and during observation of the task
done by another.42 This, in turn, causes the same regions of the brain to be
involved in the recognition and the expression of specific emotions.43 For
example, the anterior insula and the cingulate cortex are consistently
activated during the experience of pain as well as the observation of pain in
another.44 This is associated with personal distress at witnessing another
person’s suffering.45 Another important aspect of empathy is recognizing the
target being observed as separate from oneself. This activates the temporal
lobe and prefrontal cortex.46
Researchers measure two different categories of empathy: state and trait
empathy.47 As opposed to the cognitive and affective components, state and
trait empathy refer to the type of empathy that is being measured, not the
mechanism by which empathy is experienced. State empathy is inspired by
a specific set of circumstances and is temporary.48 This type of empathy is
created in a particular circumstance when participants are induced to feel
empathy for a target. In contrast, trait empathy is an individual’s natural
ability to empathize with other people.49 Trait empathy is considered to be
an individual difference and is generally stable. While researchers can
measure trait empathy using personality scales, they cannot (currently)
manipulate it.50

42. See Karen E. Gerdes et al., Teaching Empathy: A Framework Rooted in Social
Cognitive Neuroscience and Social Justice, 47 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 109, 114 (2011); see also
Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Jean Decety, From the Perception of Action to the Understanding
of Intention, 2 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 561, 566 (2001) (finding that the premotor
cortex, the parietal lobe, the supplementary motor area, and the cerebellum are included in the
neural network).
43. See Decety & Hodges, supra note 19, at 104.
44. See Philip L. Jackson et al., How Do We Perceive the Pain of Others? A Window into
the Neural Processes Involved in Empathy, 24 NEUROIMAGE 771, 775 (2005) (“The results
demonstrate that watching other individuals in pain-inducing situations triggers a specific part
of a neural network known to be involved in self-pain processing.”).
45. See Walter, supra note 39, at 12, 14 (discussing that activation in these brain regions
may be due to distress rather than the affective component of empathy).
46. See generally Tania Singer et al., Empathetic Neural Responses Are Modulated by the
Perceived Fairness of Others, 439 NATURE 466 (2006).
47. See Walter, supra note 39, at 9.
48. See Tania Singer et al., Effects of Oxytocin and Prosocial Behavior on Brain
Responses to Direct and Vicariously Experienced Pain, 8 EMOTION 781, 787 (2008).
49. See id. Trait empathy may be a result of a genetic component to empathy. This
hypothesis has been supported by twin studies. See Walter, supra note 39, at 14. However,
without social interaction and emotional bonds with others, it is unlikely that empathy will
develop even if a person has a biological predisposition for it. See Jean Decety & Philip L.
Jackson, The Functional Architecture of Human Empathy, 3 BEHAV. & COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE REVIEWS 71, 72 (2004).
50. See Decety & Jackson, supra note 49, at 191.
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Finally, there is some evidence that brain stem neuropeptides,51 such as
oxytocin and vasopressin, are correlated with empathy.52 For instance,
researchers have found that oxytocin is associated with increased empathy.53
Genetic variants affecting oxytocin receptors influence a person’s innate
predisposition to feel empathy,54 while the administration of oxytocin in a
laboratory setting has been shown to increase empathy. Specifically,
increased oxytocin has been shown to increase empathetic concern for the
victim of a crime and also improve prosocial feelings, such as trust,
generosity, and cooperation.55 Nevertheless, studies in which oxytocin is
administered do not yield consistent results, with some research finding no
effect of oxytocin on feelings of empathy for another person who is in pain.56
Most research has focused on oxytocin, and the link between vasopressin and
empathy is unclear.57 There is some evidence, however, that suggests that
vasopressin may influence generosity toward strangers and similar social
behaviors.58
B. Individual Differences in Empathy
Even though trait empathy is somewhat unpredictable, individual
differences in empathy do matter. Individuals with higher trait empathy are
more likely to mimic another’s facial expression, are better at decoding
others’ expressed emotions, and may exhibit more neural resonance when
observing another’s pain.59 In addition, studies suggest that variations in trait
empathy are correlated with variations in brain structure.60
Perhaps one of the most prominent stereotypes related to empathy is that
women are more empathetic than men.61 Consistent with that stereotype,
51. Neuropeptides are molecules that can influence the activity of the brain. See Andreas
Meyer-Lindenberg et al., Oxytocin and Vasopressin in the Human Brain: Social
Neuropeptides for Translational Medicine, 12 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 524, 524
(2011).
52. See C. Sue Carter et al., Neural and Evolutionary Perspectives on Empathy, in THE
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, supra note 14, at 169, 179.
53. See Walter, supra note 39, at 14.
54. See id. at 14–15.
55. See Krueger et al., supra note 29, at 496–97.
56. See Singer et al., supra note 48, at 787.
57. See Anneke E.K. Buffone & Michael J. Poulin, Empathy, Target Distress, and
Neurohormone Genes Interact to Predict Aggression for Others—Even Without Provocation,
40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1406, 1407 (2014).
58. See id.
59. See Alicia J. Hofelich & Stephanie D. Preston, The Meaning in Empathy:
Distinguishing Conceptual Encoding from Facial Mimicry, Trait Empathy, and Attention to
Emotion, 26 COGNITION & EMOTION 119, 120 (2012).
60. See Alessio Avenanti et al., The Pain of a Model in the Personality of an Onlooker:
Influence of State-Reactivity and Personality Traits on Embodied Empathy for Pain, 44
NEUROIMAGE 275, 276 (2009); Michael J. Banissy et al., Inter-individual Differences in
Empathy Are Reflected in Human Brain Structure, 62 NEUROIMAGE 2034, 2038 (2012). It is
not yet known whether variation in brain structure contributes to, or is a consequence of,
individual differences in empathy.
61. See Martin L. Hoffmann, Sex Differences in Empathy and Related Behaviors, 84
PSYCHOL. BULL. 712, 712 (1977); see also REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN STORM: THE
FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 3–4 (2010) (noting that Simon Baron-Cohen’s

2016]

WHEN EMPATHY BITES BACK

581

researchers find that women show higher levels of affective and cognitive
empathy on self-report measures.62 These differences decrease, however,
when it is unclear what the survey is measuring, which suggests that women
may report being empathetic to meet societal expectations.63 A variety of
behavioral studies of empathy also find that women are more empathetic than
men.64 For example, studies have found that both young girls and adult
women are better at inferring what other people are thinking compared to
males of the same age.65 In addition, gender differences have been found in
the mirror neuron system, with females showing stronger motor resonance to
observation of motor activity.66 Overall, however, scientists have been
unable to find consistent physical differences in male and female brains
despite years of effort.67 In addition, as is true with respect to many other
gender differences, neuroscience cannot yet answer whether such differences
are attributable to a neurological predisposition or different socialization.68
Women are rewarded for having traits related to empathy, such as
compassion and responsiveness to the needs of others, while men
traditionally are encouraged to acquire a different set of traits, such as
problem solving and logic.69 Consistent with the influence of socialization,
the increased trait empathy in women usually is attributed to enhanced
motivation to empathize rather than an intrinsic skill.70 It is however, worth
noting the influence of oxytocin on empathy, as described above, which
suggests a possible biological basis for some differences in empathy, given
that women have much higher levels of oxytocin.71
research on sex differences in “empathizers” and “systemizers” has provoked controversy as
an explanation for why there are fewer female scientists and engineers compared with female
teachers and nurses).
62. See Banissy et al., supra note 60, at 2036 (finding that women scored higher on selfreport measures of empathic concern for an observed individual and personal distress at
witnessing negative experiences of others). But see William Ickes et al., Gender Differences
in Emapthic Accuracy:
Differential Ability or Differential Motivation?, 7 PERS.
RELATIONSHIPS 95, 95 (2000) (describing studies finding that men and women believe that
women had more emotional insight than men, suggesting that this may reflect an American
stereotype).
63. See Yawei Cheng et al., Gender Differences in the Mu Rhythm of the Human MirrorNeuron System, PLOS ONE 4 (May 2008), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/asset?id=
10.1371/journal.pone.0002113.PDF [https://perma.cc/HZQ9-S8SR].
64. See Bhismadev Chakrabarti & Simon Baron-Cohen, Empathizing: Neurocognitive
Developmental Mechanisms and Individual Differences, 156 PROGRESS BRAIN RES. 403, 408–
09 (2006) (reviewing research on gender differences in empathy). Simon Baron-Cohen
theorizes that “the female brain is predominantly hard-wired for empathy” based on low fetal
exposure to testosterone, but research findings across samples and research teams have been
largely inconsistent. JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 61, at 85–87; see also Martin Schulte-Ruther
et al., Gender Differences in Brain Networks Supporting Empathy, 42 NEUROIMAGE 393
(2008).
65. See Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, supra note 64, at 408.
66. See Cheng et al., supra note 63, at 1–2.
67. See JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 61, at 49–52.
68. See Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, supra note 64, at 408.
69. See Hoffmann, supra note 61, at 712.
70. See Ickes et al., supra note 62, at 107–08.
71. See Walter, supra note 39, at 14. Women have even higher levels of oxytocin while
giving birth, during breast feeding, and during early interactions with their babies. See Jennifer
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In addition to gender differences, research has shown disparities in
empathy correlated with age, though the results are not always consistent.72
In one study, older adults (aged sixty to eighty) demonstrated higher levels
of affective empathy and gave higher self-report measures of cognitive
empathy than any other age group.73 However, despite their high self-report
measures, when older adults were given a test which required them to
interpret what emotion was being communicated by a pair of eyes, their
scores on the test were significantly lower than any other age group.74 These
apparently contradictory results could be reconciled as reflecting the fact that
older adults have more difficulty interpreting emotional cues than any other
age group, as demonstrated in other studies,75 and may suggest that cognitive
empathy requires a more effortful process for older adults.76
Individual differences in the ability or propensity to empathize may predict
behavior.77 This distinction between capacity and propensity reflects the fact
that the cognitive component of empathy is not automatic but depends on
attention and motivation.78 For example, when helping others is costly,
individuals will have decreased motivation to empathize.79 When ability and
propensity are distinguished, one interesting result is that individuals who are
diagnosed with psychopathy (and juveniles diagnosed with a conduct
disorder) have high ability to emphasize but low propensity to empathize.80
Experience also plays a role in empathy, but it is a double-edged sword.
Individuals who have experienced adversity are better able to take another
person’s perspective in a similar situation and, thus, are more likely to

Hahn-Holbrook et al., Parental Precaution: Neurobiological Means and Adaptive Ends, 35
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 1052, 1061–62 (2011) (describing studies finding that
breast feeding mothers have higher levels of circulating oxytocin and increased aggressive
tendencies toward potential intruders compared to formula feeding mothers).
72. See Linda Rueckert & Nicolette Naybar, Gender Differences in Empathy: The Role
of the Right Hemisphere, 67 BRAIN & COGNITION 162, 165 (2008); see also Zeinab Khanjani
et al., Comparison of Cognitive Empathy, Emotional Empathy, and Social Functioning in
Different Age Groups, 50 AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOLOGIST 80, 83 (2015) (noting in addition that
there “is a contradictory literature about the change of empathy during ageing”).
73. See Khanjani et al., supra note 72.
74. See id. at 81–83 (describing the “Eyes Test” as an exam which “requir[es] participants
to select which of four words best describes the thoughts or feelings expressed in 36 pictures
of the eyes”).
75. See Sarah E. MacPherson et al., Age, Executive Function, and Social Decision
Making: A Dorsolateral Prefrontal Theory of Cognitive Aging, 17 PSYCHOL. & AGING 598,
606 (2002) (finding an age impairment for “labeling the emotion sadness”); Louise H. Phillips
et al., Age and the Understanding of Emotions: Neuropsychological and Sociocognitive
Perspectives, 57 J. GERONTOLOGY SERIES B P526, P529 (2002) (finding “no overall age effect
on identifying emotions from faces” but “significant age impairments in the ability to identify
anger and sadness”).
76. See Khanjani et al., supra note 72, at 83 (“Emotion recognition is a gut feeling for
young adults, but older adults need to dedicate more processing resources to achieve
accuracy.”).
77. See Christian Keysers & Valeria Gazzola, Dissociating the Ability and Propensity for
Empathy, 18 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 163, 163 (2014).
78. See id. at 163–64.
79. See id. at 164.
80. See id. at 163.
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experience empathic concern.81 This in turn causes a propensity to be
compassionate and to partake in costly prosocial behavior.82 However,
reduced empathy after repeated exposure to suffering can in some instances
be adaptive because it may lower the personal distress associated with
observing the suffering of another.83 Consequently (and counterintuitively),
in certain situations, individuals with multiple exposure to an empathytriggering situation may be less likely to react empathetically.84 For example,
doctors with experience administering acupuncture are less likely than
nondoctors to experience empathy when seeing body parts being pricked by
needles.85
C. Out-Group Bias and Empathy
Human beings are prone to characterize others into “in-groups” and “outgroups.”86 Categorization may be based on race, age, and gender, as well as
multiple other affiliation factors. Considering another person to be in the
same category as oneself contributes to a feeling of similarity, which in turn
increases empathy.87 Moreover, thinking of others as part of a different
category increases alienation, which interferes with humanization, the ability
to understand the other person’s perspective and attribute human
characteristics to the other person.88

81. See Daniel Lim & David DeSteno, Suffering and Compassion: The Links Among
Adverse Life Experiences, Empathy, Compassion, and Prosocial Behavior, 16 EMOTION 175,
180 (2016). Examples of adversity include illness, violence, bereavement, socialenvironmental stress, and disasters. See id. at 177.
82. See id.
83. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
84. See Yawei Cheng et al., Expertise Modulates the Perception of Pain in Others, 17
CURRENT BIOLOGY 1708, 1711–12 (2007).
85. See id.
86. See Ruben T. Azevedo et al., Their Pain Is Not Our Pain: Brain and Autonomic
Correlates of Empathetic Resonance with the Pain of Same and Different Race Individuals,
34 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 3168, 3169 (2013).
87. See Plumm & Terrance, supra note 20, at 191; Adam Waytz & Nicholas Epley, Social
Connection Enables Dehumanization, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 70, 71 (2012)
(finding that “[b]eing part of a football team, political party, a church, or a married couple
identifies who is in one’s social circle as well as who is out of one’s circle”); see also John F.
Dovidio et al., Empathy and Intergroup Relations, in PROSOCIAL MOTIVES, EMOTION, AND
BEHAVIOR: THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 393, 395 (Mario Mikulincer & Phillip
Shaver eds., 2010); James D. Johnson et al., Rodney King and O.J. Revisited: The Impact of
Race and Defendant Empathy Induction on Judicial Decisions, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1208, 1208–09 (2002).
88. See Waytz & Epley, supra note 87, at 71 (“People consider themselves to be
exemplars of humanity, and as others become less similar to the self, they are evaluated as less
humanlike as well.”). This is reflected in the tendency of soccer fans to be willing to engage
in costly helping behavior for fans of the same team, but not for fans of the rival team. See
Boris C. Bernhardt & Tania Singer, The Neural Basis of Empathy, 35 ANN. REV.
NEUROSCIENCE 1, 12–13 (2012).
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1. Race and the Influence of Bias
Racial categorization can occur subliminally and within milliseconds.89
Because race is such a “powerful salient cue of group membership,” the race
of an actor can greatly influence the observer’s ability to empathize.90
Observations of neural activity reveal a disturbing fact: people respond more
strongly to the pain of same-race individuals than to the pain of different-race
individuals.91 Specifically, neurological mirror systems are less responsive
when viewing people of another race in pain, thus causing individuals to
experience decreased sharing of the emotional components of pain in people
of another race.92 Moreover, these disparities are correlated with implicit
bias levels—participants with greater implicit bias are even less affected
when viewing physical suffering of other-race individuals than are
participants with lower levels of implicit bias.93 One factor that may be
driving this result is that implicit bias may impact the ability to recognize
emotions, like sadness and anger, in out-group members.94 For example,
individuals with higher levels of implicit bias are quicker to perceive anger
in black faces compared to white faces.95 Finally, studies focusing on
cognition and prejudice have found a correlation between implicit bias and
differences in amygdala activation.96 Studies have also found that
participants tend to present greater amygdala activity in response to black
89. See Azevedo et al., supra note 86, at 3169.
90. Id.
91. Multiple studies reveal different responses to watching hands or faces of the same
race, another race, and a fictitious race (violet) being pricked by a needle or poked with a Qtip. See Alessio Avenanti et al., Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor Resonance with
Other-Race Pain, 20 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1018, 1018–19 (2010) (finding that when white and
black individuals living in Italy observed the pain of same-race and fictional-race individuals,
their corticospinal systems were inhibited as if they were feeling the pain, but this did not
occur when they observed other-race individuals in pain); Azevedo et al., supra note 86, at
3179 (examining white and black participants and finding increased hemodynamic activity
within the bilateral anterior insula (an area involved in processing of first- and third-person
emotional experiences of pain) for same-race pain); Vani A. Mathur et al., Racial
Identification Modulates Default Network Activity for Same and Other Races, 33 HUM. BRAIN
MAPPING 1883, 1888–90 (2012) (finding increased activity within the medial prefrontal cortex
(associated with the self) when viewing pictures of same-race individuals in a natural disaster);
Xiaojing Xu et al., Do You Feel My Pain?: Racial Group Membership Modulates Empathic
Neural Responses, 29 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8525, 8528 (2009) (scanning Chinese and white
participants and finding reduced neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (associated
with the emotional experience of pain) when watching different-race faces in pain).
92. See Avenanti et al., supra note 60, at 275–76.
93. See Avenanti et al., supra note 91, at 1019–20 (finding a linear relationship between
implicit bias and increased empathic-related brain responses for own-race pain compared to
other-race pain); Azevedo et al., supra note 86, at 3175–76 (same).
94. See Gijsbert Bijlstra et al., Stereotype Associations and Emotion Recognition, 40
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 567, 571–74 (2014).
95. See Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice
and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 641–43 (2003).
96. See Jennifer T. Kubota et al., The Neuroscience of Race, 15 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE
940, 940–42 (2012); Adam M. Chekroud et al., A Review of Neuroimaging Studies of RaceRelated Prejudice:
Does Amygdala Response Reflect Threat?, FRONTIERS HUM.
NEUROSCIENCE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnhum.2014.001
79/full [https://perma.cc/H4YG-L58N].
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male faces, regardless of the participants’ race and gender.97 This increased
activation may reflect a threat response, which is likely caused by the
stereotype that black men are dangerous.98
These observations are corroborated by behavioral studies, which also find
a connection between racial groups and empathy.99 Most pertinent here,
mock jury studies find that participants report greater empathy for same-race
criminal defendants than for other-race defendants and accordingly assign
harsher punishment to other-race defendants.100
2. Dehumanization
Dehumanization occurs when someone denies uniquely human
characteristics, for example, a mental state or secondary emotions like
nostalgia or humiliation,101 to another human being.102 Dehumanization can
lead to a general feeling of indifference to another person and his or her wellbeing.103
Lasana Harris and his colleagues developed the stereotype content model
to explain how dehumanization occurs.104 Their model posits that people use
stereotypes as automatic mental shortcuts to determine the “humanness” of
another.105 Harris maintains that people perceive others along two different
dimensions: warmth and competence.106 Someone who is perceived as high
97. See Chekroud et al., supra note 96, at 3.
98. See id. at 4.
99. See, e.g., Brian B. Drwecki et al., Reducing Racial Disparities in Pain Treatment: The
Role of Empathy and Perspective-Taking, 152 PAIN 1001, 1003–04 (2011) (finding that white
nurses and students exhibited greater empathy to white patients’ pain expressions, which
predicted better pain treatment to white patients).
100. See Johnson et al., supra note 87, at 1215–16 (finding that white students reported
greater empathy for white criminal defendants than black defendants and assigned more
lenient punishment to white defendants); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Emotion, Authority,
and Death: (Raced) Negotiations in Mock Capital Jury Deliberations, 40 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 377, 395–400 (2015) (finding that white male jurors were more likely to focus on
empathy for white male defendants during jury deliberation and more likely to downplay the
importance of empathy for black male defendants and that this increased focus on empathy
lead to significantly more life sentences).
101. See Waytz & Epley, supra note 87, at 70.
102. See C. Daryl Cameron et al., The Emotional Cost of Humanity: Anticipated
Exhaustion Motivates Dehumanization of Stigmatized Targets, 7 SOC. PSYCHOL. &
PERSONALITY SCI. 105, 105 (2016) (discussing the “intentional stance,” wherein people grant
humanity to others by assuming that they have their own minds, intentions, plans, and goals);
Lasana T. Harris & Susan Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging
Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847 (2006).
103. See Waytz & Epley, supra note 87, at 74–75 (“[D]ehumanization is often conceived
as a source of antipathy toward others—a visceral disliking—when it may in fact be better
understood as a general indifference or apathy to others’ mental states and experience.”).
104. See Harris & Fiske, supra note 102, at 847; see also Beatrice H. Capestany & Lasana
T. Harris, Stereotype Content, in EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY, SEARCHABLE, AND LINKABLE RESOURCE 1, 5–6 (Robert A.
Scott & Stephen M. Kosslyn eds., 2015) (ebook).
105. See Capestany & Harris, supra note 104, at 2 (“But if stereotypes short-circuit regular
social cognitive processes that allow us to perceive a person as human, stereotypes will
involuntarily allow for some outgroups . . . to be denied their humanness.”).
106. See Harris & Fiske, supra note 102, at 847.
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in “warmth” would be believed by others to have good intentions and be
friendly, trustworthy, and sincere.107 Someone who is perceived as high in
“competence” would be believed by others to be capable and have agency.108
The theory postulates that people behave toward others according to their
perceived level of warmth and competence.109 If someone is perceived as
high competence and high warmth, others view them with pride. Envy is
associated with high competence and low warmth, and pity is associated with
low competence and high warmth.110
If someone is perceived to be low in both warmth and competence, others
will be disgusted by them.111 Disgust is the only emotion which results in
the dehumanization of the target and often occurs when the target is an outgroup member.112 The social cognition brain network is activated at a
reduced level when participants feel disgust toward one another.113
Stereotypes, including biases against out-group members, can help explain
why dehumanization occurs.114 When stereotypes are relied upon, the
targeted individual is not given the benefit of social cognitive processing,
which would ascribe thoughts, feelings, and motivations to that person.
Dehumanization may also occur if the observer wishes to participate in
immoral behavior (in particular, causing harm to another),115 cope with his
or her own past wrongdoing,116 or avoid the emotional exhaustion associated
with helping another.117
107. See Susan T. Fiske, Varieties of (De)Humanization: Divided by Competition and
Status, 60 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 53, 54 (2013).
108. See id.
109. See Hughes, supra note 23, at 548–50 (summarizing the stereotype content model in
more detail).
110. See id.
111. See Cameron et al., supra note 102, at 1.
112. See id.; Hughes, supra note 23, at 549, 551.
113. See Capestany & Harris, supra note 104, at 7. The social cognition brain network
consists of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which becomes activated when participants
engage in social cognition tasks. See Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Social Groups That
Elicit Disgust Are Differentially Processed in mPFC, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE
NEUROSCIENCES 45, 45–48 (2007); see also Hughes, supra note 23, at 551 (discussing how the
mPFC is also activated at a lower level when participants view out-group members).
114. See Capestany & Harris, supra note 104, at 8, 11; Waytz & Epley, supra note 87, at
71 (“[T]he clearest examples of dehumanization arise in intergroup settings in which ingroup
members dehumanize outgroup members.”).
115. Sabina Cehajic et al., What Do I Care?: Perceived Ingroup Responsibility and
Dehumanization as Predictors of Empathy Felt for the Victim Group, 12 GROUP PROCESSES &
INTERGROUP REL. 715, 716–17 (2009). The desire to participate in immoral behavior is
associated with greater tolerance of harm aimed toward an out-group due to moral exclusion,
which occurs when a target is perceived to exist outside of the realm in which moral values
and fairness apply. See Susan Opotow, Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction, 46
J. SOC. ISSUES 1, 1–2 (1990).
116. See Emanuele Castano & Roger Giner-Sorlla, Not Quite Human: Infrahumanization
in Response to Collective Responsibility for Intergroup Killing, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 804, 816–17 (2006) (finding that people dehumanize victims to excuse actions of
their in-group members); Cehajic et al., supra note 115, at 716–18 (finding that it is easier for
spectators to disengage from pain and avoid feeling empathy for a victim if that victim is
dehumanized).
117. See Cameron et al., supra note 102, at 2, 6 (finding anticipated emotional exhaustion
of helping a homeless person mediates whether the participant assigns a mental state to the
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Dehumanization has been shown to result in reduced empathy and
diminished motivation to help others. For example, participants perceive
helping a homeless person suffering from drug addiction (a stigmatized, outgroup condition) to be more exhausting than providing aid to a homeless
person suffering from uncontrollable mental illness (a less stigmatized
condition).118 They also viewed the homeless person afflicted with mental
illness to be suffering more than the drug addict. This study suggests that
feelings of disgust create a mental barrier to helping someone in need because
the effort to help that person is perceived as more emotionally taxing than
helping someone else.
Some research has shown that people in positions of power are more likely
to dehumanize out-group members, especially after being asked to make a
difficult decision that could negatively impact an out-group.119 In this
situation, dehumanization is used to justify a difficult decision for which the
decision maker feels responsible. This is also true where the person is not
responsible for the decision, but his or her in-group is responsible.120 Thus,
for example, if one country declares war on another, a citizen may
dehumanize those living in the other country.121 Ironically, a social
connection may at times enable dehumanization.122 Participants who were
primed by researchers to feel a social connection were more likely to
dehumanize out-group members.123 One possible explanation for this result
is that people who feel socially disconnected have a greater need to create
bonds with other humans and thus are more likely to exert energy to connect
with strangers or out-group members.124
In the courtroom, the process of dehumanization may be facilitated by the
purposeful engagement of stereotypes. Most transparent is the use of
language linking an African American defendant to nonhuman primates.125
Research has shown that both black and white participants associate
photographs of black people with apes. Moreover, this association is often
present even in participants who do not display overt racism. The media may
both reflect and exacerbate such associations: newspapers are far more likely
homeless person); cf. Jeroen Vaes & Martina Muratore, Defensive Dehumanization in the
Medical Practice: A Cross-Sectional Study from a Health Care Worker’s Perspective, 52
BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 180, 185–87 (2013) (showing that nurses who humanize their patients
report higher levels of emotional exhaustion).
118. Cameron et al., supra note 102, at 5–6.
119. See Joris Lammers & Diederik A. Stapel, Power Increases Dehumanization, 14
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 113, 122 (2011).
120. See Castano & Giner-Sorlla, supra note 116.
121. See id. at 806.
122. See Waytz & Epley, supra note 87, at 74–75.
123. See id. To prime social connection, participants were asked to come to the study with
a close friend. See id. at 73.
124. See id. at 71 (“People who feel socially disconnected likewise seek to satisfy this drive
by attempting to connect with others, even attributing humanlike traits to nonhuman agents
that render them suitable agents of social connection . . . [and] people who feel socially
connected are less motivated to affiliate with others.”).
125. See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292,
292–93 (2008).
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to describe African American defendants facing the death penalty with aperelated words than they are to describe white defendants with those words.126
The association to apes is linked to disgust. Priming participants to feel
disgust causes them to associate out-group members with animals at higher
rates.127 These associations are not without consequence; when participants
are primed with the word “ape,” they are more likely to believe that physical
violence used against a black suspect by the police was justified.128
D. Empathy-Linked Aggression
Prosocial behavior, including empathy-motivated altruism, is regulated by
a caregiving behavioral system through which individuals are motivated to
help and reduce the suffering of others.129 The empathy-altruism hypothesis
suggests that empathy leads to a desire to help someone who is in trouble.130
This system is activated when someone witnesses the plight of a “valued”
other, or someone in the same in-group. As noted earlier, this process is
facilitated by oxytocin and vasopressin, both of which influence social
behavior and empathy.131
Although activation of this system typically leads to prosocial behavior,
empathy-induced behavior is not necessarily moral.132 This is because the
empathy-induced altruism is a narrow target, focused on the distressed
individual, and may ignore larger concerns such as fairness or impartiality.133
For example, when individuals feel no empathy, they tend to distribute
resources in a game fairly, but when they are induced to feel empathy for a
targeted group, they give preferential treatment to that group.134
More troubling, researchers have shown that empathy can lead to
antisocial and aggressive behavior.135 If a person is motivated to protect the
target of his or her empathy, that person may be inclined to punish others
who are hurting or inhibiting that target. For example, in one study,
researchers found that giving oxytocin to participants increased the
126. See id. at 303–04 (examining the usage of fifty-four words connoting bestial or
subhuman qualities in news articles).
127. See Erin E. Buckles & Paul D. Trapnell, Disgust Facilitates Outgroup
Dehumanization, 16 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 771, 776–77 (2013).
128. See Goff et al., supra note 125, at 302.
129. See Jennifer L. Goetz et al., Compassion: An Evolutionary Analysis and Empirical
Review, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 351, 354 (2010).
130. See C. Daniel Batson et al., Empathic Joy and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis, 61
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 413, 413 (1991).
131. See Buffone & Poulin, supra note 57, at 1418–19; see also supra notes 51–57 and
accompanying text. Neurotransmitters are activated when someone senses distress in another
and motivate the actor to provide aid to the vulnerable person.
132. See C. Daniel Batson et al., Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altruism: When
Compassion and Justice Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1042, 1043 (1995).
133. See id.
134. See id.; see also Julie A. Weir & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Determinants of Mock
Jurors’ Verdicts in a Rape Case, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 901, 913–15 (1990) (finding
that empathy for victims predicted belief that the victim had been raped).
135. See Johannes Keller & Stefan Pfattheicher, The Compassion-Hostility Paradox: The
Interplay of Vigilant, Prevention-Focused Self-Regulation, Compassion, and Hostility, 39
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1518, 1521 (2013).
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participant’s empathy for in-group members—but also increased aggression
toward competing out-group members.136 In another study, researchers
found that participants who were in a high-empathy condition were more
likely to give greater amounts of painful stimulus (hot sauce) to the
empathetic target’s competitors, even though the competitor did not cause
any harm to the target.137 Researchers also have found that mock jurors who
have high empathy for a victim are more confident in a defendant’s guilt,
believe the defendant to be more responsible for the crime, and give harsher
sentences.138
Observation of this association between aggression and empathy, often
referred to as the compassion-hostility paradox,139 is consistent with the
results of prior research from the Capital Jury Project (CPJ). The CPJ
interviews revealed that juror empathy for murder victims influences capital
sentencing: when jurors reported that they had imagined themselves in the
victim’s situation, they were more likely to have felt empathy for the victim
and more likely to have sentenced the defendant to death.140
Several factors predict empathy-linked aggression. Interestingly, more
empathetic people seem more likely to experience empathy-induced
aggression.141 For example, one study found participants who scored high
on an empathy scale were more likely to punish the behavior of a drunk driver
(as well as more willing to help the victim) than less empathetic
participants.142 Another factor that may predict empathy-linked aggression
is the intensity of the victim’s distress.143 Finally, when emotional stimuli
cause heightened emotion, effortful cognitive processing is decreased.144
This decrease in cognitive processing may lead to increased punitiveness,
because jurors do not have the emotional capacity to empathize and relate to
the perpetrator of the victim’s distress.
Nevertheless, empathy does not always produce aggression. Some studies
have found that empathy can reduce the desire to harm intentional
136. See Carsten K.W. De Dreu et al., The Neuropeptide Oxytocin Regulates Parochial
Altruism in Intergroup Conflict Among Humans, 328 SCIENCE 1408, 1409–11 (2010) (testing
participants’ response to nonteammates during a financially based game after being given
oxytocin or a placebo).
137. See Buffone & Poulin, supra note 57, at 1418–19.
138. See Sheila R. Deitz et al., Measurement of Empathy Toward Rape Victims and Rapists,
43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 372, 376 (1982) (using the example of an ambiguous
rape trial).
139. See De Dreu et al., supra note 136, at 1408–11 (showing that there is a positive
association between compassion and hostility).
140. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and
Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV 343, 359–60 (2003).
141. See Buffone & Poulin, supra note 57, at 1408.
142. See Guy D. Vitaglione & Mark A. Barnett, Assessing a New Dimension of Empathy:
Empathetic Anger as a Predictor of Helping and Punishing Desires, 27 MOTIVATION &
EMOTION 301, 312–13 (2003) (using a scale that measures trait-empathetic aggression); see
also Buffone & Poulin, supra note 57, at 1417–18.
143. See Buffone & Poulin, supra note 57, at 1408.
144. See Jessica M. Salerno & Bette L. Bottoms, Emotional Evidence and Jurors’
Judgments: The Promise of Neuroscience for Informing Psychology and Law, 27 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 273, 277 (2009).
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wrongdoers. For example, in an experiment in which a confederate cheated
on a task to earn higher compensation than the other competitors, participants
were asked to choose how much hot sauce the cheating confederate would be
required to consume.145 When the confederate cheated, the participants gave
the confederate far more hot sauce than when the confederate did not cheat.
However, when participants underwent a compassion-inducing task toward
an unrelated third-party before being asked to assign the hot sauce amounts,
the participants no longer punished the confederate. The more compassion
the participants felt toward the third party, the less hot sauce the participant
gave to the confederate. Thus, in this scenario, priming participants with
feelings of compassion resulted in less aggression toward an intentional
wrongdoer.
One might speculate that these results can be reconciled by the difference
between the targets of empathy; that is, when the target of empathy has been
harmed by the wrongdoer, then aggression is induced, but when the target of
the empathy is unrelated to the wrongdoer, empathy is increased for the
wrongdoer as well. However, research also shows that doses of oxytocin
increase the perception of harm suffered by a victim, yet do not
simultaneously increase the desire to punish those that cause the harm.146
E. Increasing Empathy
Researchers have tried to induce empathy in two ways. First, a person’s
emotional state may be conveyed to the prospective empathizer through
facial expressions, bodily movements, and visible injuries. Alternatively,
empathy may be induced by cognitive processes such as inferences or
thoughts based on contextual information, for example, by learning that
someone has lost a job or been diagnosed with a serious illness.147
Instructing the participant to imagine him- or herself in the other’s place
increases the empathic neural response above and beyond the level of
empathy experienced while watching a person.148 In one odd application of
this idea, researchers were able to stimulate activity in the social cognition
brain network of participants by asking the participants to consider whether
the photographed out-group member liked a certain vegetable.149 However,
the same humanizing brain activity was not triggered when participants were
asked to imagine what the person’s age was.150 One interpretation of these
results is that trying to assess someone else’s preferences requires imagining
how that person would think about things, which has an “individuating”
effect, in the words of the researchers.151 In contrast, estimation of age
145. See Paul Condon & David DeSteno, Compassion for One Reduces Punishment for
Another, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 698, 698–701 (2011).
146. See Krueger et al., supra note 29.
147. See Walter, supra note 39, at 11.
148. See Decety & Jackson, supra note 49, at 84.
149. See Harris & Fiske, supra note 113, at 50.
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation,
from Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation
on Attention and Interpretation, 23 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1–2 (1990).
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focuses on the outside, permitting the subject to use external cues, and
therefore does not require imagination or individuation.
Other research corroborates these neuroscience results.
Social
psychologists have found that similar instructions induce empathy for outgroup members,152 reduce prejudice and bias toward the out-group,153 and
improve attitudes toward the out-group as a whole.154 Induced empathy can
increase positive attitudes toward stigmatized groups.155 In one study,
participants who listened to interviews with convicted murderers and who
were asked to imagine that they were in their position showed more positive
feelings toward convicted murders two weeks after the study than
participants who were asked to remain objective.156
Similar techniques have been used to study the effects of empathy on jury
decision making in criminal cases. For example, in one study, participants
read a narrative about a larceny case and then were instructed to read a
passage written by the defendant in order to get more information about the
defendant.157 Participants in a high-empathy condition were asked to put
themselves in the position of the defendant while reading the passage, while
participants in a low-empathy condition were asked to be objective.158
Participants in a control condition did not read the passage about the
defendant.159 Participants in the high-empathy condition gave the defendant
more lenient punishments than participants in the other two conditions and
also tended to view the crime as situationally induced rather than as a product
of the defendant’s character.160 However, across all conditions, white
defendants were given more lenient punishments.161
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL SENTENCING
Now we turn to the practical uses of empathy research in capital
sentencing, with a focus on jury selection, the presentation of evidence, and
arguments made by defense counsel.

152. See Krystina A. Finlay & Walter G. Stephan, Improving Intergroup Relations: The
Effects of Empathy on Racial Attitudes, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1720, 1727–28 (2000).
153. See Dovidio et al., supra note 87, at 397; Paola Sessa et al., Taking One’s Time in
Feeling Other-Race Pain: An Event-Related Potential Investigation on the Time-Course of
Cross-Racial Empathy, 9 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 454, 454–55 (2014).
154. See C. Daniel Batson et al., Empathy and Attitudes: Can Feeling for a Member of a
Stigmatized Group Improve Feelings Toward the Group?, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 105, 116–17 (1997).
155. See id. (studying feelings toward people with AIDS, the homeless, and convicted
murderers).
156. See id. at 116.
157. See Johnson et al., supra note 87, at 1213–14.
158. See id. at 1214.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1215–16.
161. See id. Other researchers have obtained similar results. See, e.g., Richard L. Archer
et al., Emotional Empathy in a Courtroom Simulation: A Person-Situation Interaction, 9
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 275, 287–90 (1979) (mock jurors in an empathy-induction
condition found the defendant’s involvement in a stabbing to be more lawful and less
personality dependent); Plumm & Terrance, supra note 20, at 201–03.
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A. Jury Selection
It has long been obvious that the identity of the capital jurors matters
enormously. We see this in the large disparities in willingness of various
states—and various localities within states—to impose death sentences.162
We also see this in disparities between the willingness of various
demographic groups to impose death sentences as reflected in public polls163
and as revealed in mock jury studies.164 Occasionally we see a very specific
manifestation of the importance of the decision maker when a life sentence
is imposed on a more culpable codefendant by one jury while a death
sentence is imposed upon the less culpable by another jury. The neuroscience
of empathy is very helpful in explaining how the identity of the jurors affects
decision making, but it is not so helpful in figuring out how to eliminate the
effects of individual differences.
1. Racially Similar Jurors
The prior evidence that race influences the decision making of capital
jurors came from many, many sources. These include historical evidence of
breathtaking disparities in the imposition of death sentences prior to Furman
v. Georgia,165 particularly in rape cases; multiple statistical analyses of death
sentences, most of which find large and significant race-of-the-victim effects,
and about half of which also find significant race-of-the-defendant effects,166
including some studies with independent assessment of aggravation and
mitigation;167 mock jury studies that find race-of-defendant and race-ofvictim effects in white jurors’ assessment of both aggravating and mitigating
evidence and in their choice of life or death sentences;168 mock jury studies
that find that diverse juries ameliorate the effects of racial discrimination; and
numerous individual cases in which race played an explicit invidious role in
the decision making of prosecutors, defense counsel, and jurors.169

162. See John H. Blume et al., Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial
Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 171–75 (2004).
163. See Joseph Carroll, Gallup Poll: Who Supports the Death Penalty?, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/gallup-poll-who-supportsdeath-penalty [https://perma.cc/M6M9-YMA7].
164. See John K. Cochran & Mitchell B. Chamlin, The Enduring Racial Divide in Death
Penalty Support, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 85, 85–86 (2005).
165. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
166. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5–6 (1990).
167. See David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the PostFurman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1713–15 (1998).
168. See Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension:
Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 351–53
(2000).
169. See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d
915, 939–42 (9th Cir. 2001) (Graber, J., dissenting); Matt Ford, A Tainted Execution in
Georgia, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/
kenneth-fults-execution-georgia/477969/ (discussing the case of Kenneth Fults, in which the
public defender had “a penchant for telling racist jokes,” and a juror later signed an affidavit
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What neuroscience adds to this picture is the likelihood that racially
influenced decision making often is not rooted in conscious choice but stems
from observably different reactions in the brain. This is not, of course, to say
that racial favoritism is hardwired, or biologically determined, but rather to
say that given that race is a strong predictor of perceptions of in-group and
out-group membership in our society, differential triggering of empathic
responses will be common. This means—as the prior evidence also implies—
that the racial composition of the jury in a minority-race capital defendant’s
case may be dispositive. However, the legal system’s current mechanism for
ferreting out bias—voir dire—is unable to identify bias of which potential
jurors are unaware.
Thus, neuroscience reinforces the importance of vigilant judicial
enforcement of prohibitions against discrimination in jury selection. In
recent years, the Supreme Court has been somewhat more vigilant in its
enforcement of the prohibition against racially motivated exercise of
peremptory challenges. However, reversals have largely been limited to
“smoking gun” cases.170 As many commentators have noted, the prohibition
against discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory challenge is widely
ignored, causing some commentators—and justices—to suggest its abolition.
The neuroscientific findings we report argue for either more vigorous
enforcement of the antidiscrimination norm or for an outright ban on
peremptory challenges.
But neuroscience also suggests that enforcement of prohibitions against
affirmative exclusion of minority jurors is insufficient to provide race-neutral
decisions of deathworthiness. The mechanism by which members of the
defendant’s racial or ethnic group are excluded is not the problem; it is the
ultimate composition of the jury that matters. The Supreme Court, however,
has explicitly rejected any right to racially similar jurors, so eradication of
the effects of racially influenced empathy is not a real possibility, at least in
the short run.
2. Empathetic Jurors
While voir dire is unlikely to reveal racial bias, extensive voir dire may
shed light upon which jurors have the potential to see a human being behind
a crime. The Supreme Court has insisted that defendants must be able to
present any evidence in mitigation that might reasonably lead a juror to
conclude that death is not the appropriate sentence. This insistence, however,
has no meaning if seated jurors are incapable of responding with empathy to
the relevant “diverse frailties” of humankind. General questions as to
stating, “I knew I would vote for the death penalty because that’s what that nigger deserved”)
[https://perma.cc/7SK9-25TE].
170. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (as noted in the briefs, but not the
Supreme Court’s opinion, the prosecutor argued, to the all-white jury he had selected, that the
defendant, unlike O.J. Simpson, should not be permitted to escape death penalty); Miller-El v.
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (citing numerous indicators of bias and history of explicit
discrimination by the prosecutor’s office); see also Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1744 (prosecution
jury lists had “N” marked by the names of African American jurors).
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whether jurors “can consider” evidence in mitigation cannot answer whether
a particular juror can recognize and appreciate a defendant’s suffering or can
only see the suffering the defendant has caused. Thus, courts that have
refused to permit questioning of jurors about their receptivity to particular
forms of mitigation thwart the purpose of individualized sentencing.171
Concomitantly, defense counsel who have relied upon generalizations
about what kind of jurors are likely to vote for life—jurors who have endured
hardships themselves or employed in the helping professions—must realize
that such reliance is probably ill advised. Sometimes hardship hardens,172
and sometimes those who are socially isolated are more likely to be receptive
to out-groups.173
It is interesting to note that “powerful” potential jurors may be the least
likely to be empathetic.174 This does not, however, give clear guidance to
choose the meek and lowly because the ability to “hold out” against a prodeath majority is as also critical from the defense perspective. It does,
however, lend support to the conventional wisdom that the defense does not
want a cohesive, socially integrated jury.
But at this point, even a search for “empathetic jurors” looks too simplistic.
Does a defense lawyer want an empathetic juror? Prior to doing the research
for this article, we (and we think most capital defense lawyers) would have
answered that question quickly and affirmatively. But that now appears to
be an unsophisticated answer. Jurors with higher levels of trait empathy may
be more likely to empathize with the defendant—or they may be more likely
to empathize with the victim or victim’s family and punish the defendant
more harshly. Caution seems in order, and the best recommendation may be
to closely question jurors about their receptivity to certain forms of mitigation
and the strength of their default position preferences for life and death.175
171. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 695 N.E.2d 391, 407 (Ill. 1998); Evans v. State, 637 A.2d
117 (Md. 1994); Witter v. State, 921 P.2d 886, 891–92, 915–16 (Nev. 1996); State v. Fletcher,
500 S.E.2d 668 (N.C. 1998); State v. Skipper, 446 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1994); State v. Wilson,
659 N.E.2d 292, 300–02 (Ohio 1996); State v. Powers, 501 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 1998).
172. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
174. See Lammers & Stapel, supra note 119. Jury forepersons are more likely to be male,
better educated, and of “higher status”—common traits of people who traditionally hold more
power in society. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical
Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 696 (2000). Jury
forepersons are also more influential than other jurors and their position of power and
influence may result in more punitive approaches. See id.
175. See generally John H. Blume et al., Probing “Life Qualification” Through Expanded
Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1259 (2001). In short, what we know about the
neuroscience of empathy reinforces the wisdom of Colorado’s voir dire method. This method
follows several simple principles: (1) jurors are selected based on their life and
death views only; (2) pro-death jurors (jurors who will vote for a death sentence) are
removed utilizing cause challenges, and attempts are made to retain potential lifegiving jurors; (3) pro-death jurors are questioned about their ability to respect the
decisions of the other jurors, and potential life-giving jurors are questioned about
their ability to bring a life result out of the jury room; and (4) peremptory challenges
are prioritized based on the prospective jurors’ views on punishment.
Matthew Rubenstein, Overview of the Colorado Method of Capital Voir Dire, CHAMPION,
Nov. 2010, at 18.
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B. The Presentation of Evidence
Empathy research can also inform how evidence in both aggravation and
mitigation is presented.
1. Evidence in Aggravation
Viewed formally, the penalty phase of capital trials in most jurisdictions
consists of prosecution evidence offered in aggravation and defense evidence
offered in mitigation. States differ in whether jurors are instructed that
aggravation and mitigation are to be “weighed” against each other,
considered (independently) without weighing, or, as in Texas, whether future
dangerousness must be assessed. But regardless of the statutory scheme, in
the penalty phase, the prosecution offers evidence designed to convince the
jury that the defendant deserves death, or, speaking loosely, evidence “in
aggravation” of the crime.
But whether called evidence in aggravation, victim impact evidence, or
evidence establishing guilt, much of the evidence presented by the state in a
capital trial serves to place the defendant in an out-group, and large portions
of it dehumanize him. In some measure, this is inevitable, assuming the
legitimacy of capital punishment, because some people deserve to die or are
not worthy of belonging to the human community. When dehumanization is
based solely upon the defendant’s deeds, we would have to concede that it is
consistent with capital punishment jurisprudence (though not, in our view,
normatively justified).
However, when dehumanization is pursued through tactics such as
eliciting testimony that compares aspects of the defendant’s behavior or
appearance to animals176 or repeated references to the race of the defendant
or victim, the consequence is an increased likelihood of arbitrary decision
making. There is no value to this testimony, and its elicitation should be
prohibited. When judges have to make closer calls on the relevance or
prejudice versus probative value of inflammatory facts—such as gang or hate
group membership, religious affiliation, or undocumented presence in this
country—they should be guided by the findings we have reported and assume
that the prejudicial load of such facts is very high.
Moreover, the findings reported here make plain that the focus on “victim
impact” approved by Payne v. Tennessee177 was a wrong turn. Although at
one time the Supreme Court deemed evidence of the moral character of the
victim and the consequences of the victim’s death on surviving family
members irrelevant to the capital sentencing decision, and therefore
inadmissible,178 it changed its mind. Now, the prosecution may present a
176. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986); Bennett v. Stirling, No. CV
2:13-3191-RMG, 2016 WL 1070812, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2016); see also supra notes 126–
28 and accompanying text.
177. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
178. See id.; South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989); Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496 (1987); see also John H. Blum, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in
Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 257 (2003). The term “victim impact evidence” does not
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“brief glance” into the life and character of the victim and the suffering to
others caused by his or her murder.179 Despite the fact that the prosecution
offers “victim impact” evidence as part of its penalty phase case, the Supreme
Court has declined to categorize it as evidence in aggravation, and instead
has justified its admission as balancing the picture presented to the jury,
which may hear a great deal about the life and characteristics of the
defendant. But call it aggravation or call it a “brief glimpse,” focus on the
victim raises the likelihood of empathy-induced aggression, for which there
is no constitutional justification.
2. Evidence in Mitigation
We are guessing that some defense counsel looking at this Article will skip
to this section. How is it that they can create empathy for their clients,
whatever the juror’s initial preferences were? Put differently, if the search
for trait empathy is not productive, perhaps a focus on state empathy is more
useful.
The capital defense community has already embraced specificity and detail
in the presentation of mitigation; testimony that the defendant was abused as
a child is less helpful than testimony describing the nature of his injuries, the
frequency of abuse, and specific episodes that a witness recalls. The CJP
interviews have shown that expert testimony—which tends to be general—is
most persuasive when augmented by lay witnesses observations.180 The
research on empathy explains why specificity matters: it is more likely to
evoke the automatic affective response. One might hypothesize that expert
testimony augmented by lay testimony activates both affective and cognitive
forms of empathy.
Empathy research also suggests that exclusive focus on the hardships the
defendant suffered might be a mistake; providing the jury with evidence that,
but for those hardships, the defendant “could have been a contender” may be
equally important. In other words, presenting some positive attributes and
experiences of the defendant, or even a large number of mundane experiences
or preferences, may be useful in promoting juror identification with the
defendant. This is important because, without such identification, empathy
is much less likely.
Defense counsel also should consider the possibility of trying to generate
empathy for a third party (other than the victim, of course), which research
suggests may spill over to the defendant. The obvious possibility is the
defendant’s family, depending on how sympathetic they are, but it might also
be for another person, even defense counsel in some cases. Another
possibility is to use closing arguments—where lawyers have a great deal of

refer to evidence of the impact of the crime on the victim. While the suffering inflicted on the
victim himself is undoubtedly relevant, the term refers to evidence of the impact on the
victim’s family and friends.
179. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 808.
180. See Garvey, supra note 11; Sundby, supra note 140.
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freedom to use rhetorical flourishes to illustrate their arguments—to retell
familiar stories that evoke empathy.181
C. Arguments of Counsel
By this point, it should be obvious that counsel’s use of racial imagery, or
animal imagery, or any form of emphasis on the group membership of the
defendant, victim, or witnesses, or comparison of the worth of the
defendant’s life to that of the victim, should never be permitted. The research
on empathy, however, is not needed to reach this conclusion; courts have
routinely condemned such inflammatory arguments for a long time.
Nonetheless, courts virtually never reverse cases for such arguments, citing
a host of reasons such as the “isolated” nature of the remarks, defense
counsel’s failure to object to the remarks, defense counsel’s
counterarguments, or harmlessness.182 At the very least, the neuroscience of
empathy compels the conclusion that harmlessness of the error—at least with
respect to the sentencing decision—should be taken off the list of acceptable
reasons for affirmance.
We cannot resist noting that we are fascinated by the findings regarding
asking subjects to imagine whether a wrongdoer likes vegetables. Asking
jurors to imagine dietary preferences certainly would be unconventional
argument, but perhaps these findings are simply confirmation of the broader
principle that asking jurors to imagine the defendant’s walk in life in specific
respects is likely to remind them that the defendant is an individual. Perhaps
asking jurors how they thought the defendant felt when he was beaten with a
pipe at the age of nine, or saw his mother shot at the age of twelve is as
important as eliciting the details of his abuse or trauma.
CONCLUSION:
TINKERING WITH THE MACHINERY OF EMPATHY
We began this article with Dietrich Bonhoffer’s admonition that “[w]e
must learn to regard people less in light of what they do or omit to do and
more in light of what they suffer.”183 While we find this to be an inspirational
statement, it is clearly aspirational rather than descriptive. Our introduction
juxtaposed that aspiration with the response of a real juror to the question of
why an African American defendant had committed murder: “Because he
was just a dumb nigger.”184 That juror’s response is a particularly ugly
example of the broader truth that empathy, like justice, often is not blind.
Justice Harry Blackmun, after many years of experience with capital cases,
concluded that the death penalty experiment had failed, declaring, “I no

181. One example, that is already frequently employed in closing arguments, might be to
use the New Testament story of the woman caught in adultery, about whom Jesus said, “He
that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her.” John 8:7 (King James).
182. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739,
1783 (1993).
183. See BONHOFFER, supra note 1, at 262.
184. See Cohen, supra note 2.
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longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.”185 The neuroscience of
empathy provides one more reason to believe that the decision to sentence
another human being to death is inevitably an arbitrary one, and one that
cannot be divorced from either race or caprice. While we can tinker with
aspects of capital trials that exacerbate caprice and discrimination stemming
from empathy, we cannot alter basic neural responses to the pain of others
and therefore cannot rationalize (in either sense of the word) empathic
responses.

185. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

